

## apparmor.d

Building the largest working set of AppArmor profiles

<https://github.com/roddhjav/apparmor.d>



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Irish, Public *Start Up*

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Cyber Security Hub between  
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## AppArmor

- Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
- Only what is explicitly required is authorized
- Program confined under profile
- Profiles are path based

```
1  abi <abi/3.0>,  
2  
3  include <tunables/global>  
4  
5  profile ping /{usr/,}bin/{,iputils-}ping {  
6    include <abstractions/base>  
7    include <abstractions/consoles>  
8    include <abstractions/namespace>  
9    include if exists <local/bin.ping>  
10  
11   capability net_raw,  
12   capability setuid,  
13  
14   network inet raw,  
15   network inet6 raw,  
16  
17   /etc/modules.conf r,  
18   /proc/21622/cmdline r,  
19   /{usr/}bin/{,iputils-}ping mrix,  
20  
21 }
```

Figure 1: AppArmor profile for *ping*

Apparmor is Enabled by default on Ubuntu, however:

- Profiles loaded: 39
- Processes confined: 4

Without profiles AppArmor is useless

## History

- Focus on server
- Focus on processes that face users or internet
- And...

"The permissions are fine why isn't this working?

OMG apparmor again

Who turned that on here?

```
systemctl disable apparmor
```

Problem is solved!"

`apparmor.d` - *Full set of AppArmor profiles*

There are over 50000 Linux packages and even more applications.

Not possible to write profiles for all of them.

## What to confine and why?


Let's go back to the basic...

## Security Model

*Do not trust everything that runs on your computer*

## Implementation

- Secure boot
- Immutable core system
- Sandboxed system/user applications & services
- Full system confinement



## Confine

- All root processes:

*systemd, bluetooth, dbus, polkit, NetworkManager, OpenVPN, tailscale, gdm, rtkit, colord...*

- Desktop environments: Gnome, KDE
- All user services such as *Pipewire, Gvfsd, dbus, xdg, xwayland, xorg...*
- All "sandbox managers":  
*flatpak, snap, docker, podman, toolbox, libvirt, steam...*
- Some "special" user applications: web browser, file browser..



## Project Rules

### 1. Mandatory Access Control

Only what is explicitly required should be authorized.

### 2. Do not break a program

Should not break a normal usage of the confined software.

### 3. Do not confine everything

Some programs should not be confined by a MAC policy.

### 4. Distribution and devices agnostic

No *"It works on my machine"*

Demo

AppArmor profiles can be written without any strict guidelines.

Over 1000 profiles, you need one

## Purpose

- If a rule is present in a profile, it must only be in one location.
- Check if a profile has access to a given resource
- Check if a strict Write xor Execute policy is enforced

## *aa-enabled*

- **What:** Check if apparmor is enabled
- **How:**
  1. Read module settings
  2. Ensure `/sys/kernel/security` is mounted

```
1 abi <abi/3.0>,  
2  
3 include <tunables/global>  
4  
5 @{exec_path} = @{bin}/aa-enabled  
6 profile aa-enabled @{exec_path} {  
7   include <abstractions/base>  
8   include <abstractions/consoles>  
9  
10  @{exec_path} mr,  
11  
12  @{sys}/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled r,  
13  
14  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/mounts r,  
15  
16  include if exists <local/aa-enabled>  
17 }
```

Profile attachments (Entrypoint)

Access to consoles

Local addition for system admin

Figure 2: Profile for *aa-enabled*

```
1 abi <abi/3.0>,  
2  
3  
4 include <tunables/global>  
5  
6 @exec_path = @bin/sddaemon @lib/gnupg/sddaemon  
7 profile sddaemon @exec_path {  
8   include <abstractions/base>  
9   include <abstractions/devices-usb>  
10  include <abstractions/namespace-strict>  
11  
12  network netlink raw,  
13  
14  signal (send) peer=gnupg-agent,  
15  
16  @exec_path mr,  
17  
18  owner @HOME/@XDG_GPG_DIR/sddaemon.conf r,  
19  owner @HOME/@XDG_GPG_DIR/reader_0.status rw,  
20  
21  owner @run/user/@uid/gnupg/S.sddaemon rw,  
22  owner @run/user/@uid/gnupg/d.*/S.sddaemon rw,  
23  
24  @PROC/@pid/task/@tid/comm rw,  
25  
26  @sys/devices/@pci/bConfigurationValue r,  
27  
28  include if exists <local/sddaemon>  
29 }
```

Annotations:

- Load variables → Line 4
- Access to USB → Line 8
- New system variables → Line 6
- Multiple sddaemon paths → Line 6
- Send signal to another profile → Line 12
- Admin configurable variable used everywhere → Line 16

Figure 3: Profile for sddaemon - Smartcard daemon for GnuPG.

## Children Profiles

Special profiles with common resources

Example: *xdg-open*

GUI programs that can open resources: link, image...

```
@{bin}/xdg-open rPx -> child-open,
```

Example: *foo* | *less*

```
@{bin}/less rPx -> child-pager,  
@{bin}/more rPx -> child-pager,  
@{bin}/pager rPx -> child-pager,
```

AppArmor is path based

+

Distributions like to have they own things

=



## Firefox attachments

```
/{usr/,}bin/firefox{,.sh,-esr,-bin}  
/{usr/,}lib{,32,64}/firefox{,.sh,-esr,-bin}/firefox{,.sh,-esr,-bin}  
/opt/firefox{,.sh,-esr,-bin}/firefox{,.sh,-esr,-bin}
```

## Colord attachments

```
/{usr/,}lib{,exec}/{,colord/}colord
```

## Network Manager attachments

```
/{usr/,}{,s}bin/NetworkManager
```



## Merged /usr

- Not here yet.
- */bin/foo* and */usr/bin/foo* are not the same thing

## Different Apparmor versions

apparmor *2.x*, *3.0*, *3.1* & *4.0* different features set

## Different programs versions

Compatibility issues between software versions on Arch, OpenSUSE, Ubuntu & Debian

**We need maintainer**

```
ALLOWED tracker-extract open @{/run}/udev/data/c511:2 comm=gst-plugin-scan requested_mask=r denied_mask=r
ALLOWED tracker-extract open @{/run}/udev/data/c511:0 comm=gst-plugin-scan requested_mask=r denied_mask=r
ALLOWED tracker-extract open @{/sys}/devices/system/node/node0/cpumap comm=gst-plugin-scan requested_mask=r
ALLOWED tracker-extract symlink owner /dev/char/507:0 comm=gst-plugin-scan requested_mask=c denied_mask=c
ALLOWED tracker-extract open @{/sys}/devices/@{pci_bus}/0000:00:01.0/0000:01:00.0/numa_node comm=gst-plugin-
ALLOWED tracker-extract open /opt/intel/oneapi/compiler/2023.1.0/linux/compiler/lib/intel64_lin/libirng.so
ALLOWED tracker-extract file_mmap /opt/intel/oneapi/compiler/2023.1.0/linux/compiler/lib/intel64_lin/libirn
ALLOWED tracker-extract file_mmap /opt/intel/oneapi/compiler/2023.1.0/linux/compiler/lib/intel64_lin/libint
```

Figure 4: `aa-log tracker-extract`

```
profile tracker-extract {
  /opt/intel/oneapi/compiler/2023.1.0/linux/compiler/lib/intel64_lin/libintlc.so.5 rm,
  /opt/intel/oneapi/compiler/2023.1.0/linux/compiler/lib/intel64_lin/libirng.so r,
  /opt/intel/oneapi/compiler/2023.1.0/linux/compiler/lib/intel64_lin/libirng.so rm,

  @{/run}/udev/data/c511:0 r,
  @{/run}/udev/data/c511:2 r,

  @{/sys}/devices/@{pci_bus}/0000:00:01.0/0000:01:00.0/numa_node r,
  @{/sys}/devices/system/node/node0/cpumap r,

  owner /dev/char/507:0 w,
}
```

Figure 5: `aa-log -r tracker-extract`

## Development VM

- Distribution: Archlinux, Ubuntu, OpenSUSE, Debian
- Flavor: Server, Gnome, KDE

## Dev stack

- **Packer**, **cloud-init** to generate the VM images,
- **Vagrant** to manage the test VMs

## How to tests AppArmor profiles?

### Scope

- Profiles installed by a package manager
- In the context of the target distribution & flavor
- All profiles working together
- Detect update

### Concept

- Run a profiled program in a VM and see what goes wrong
- Not testing the program, but the profile

How to run a program? *foo, foo --help, foo --do-something*

Need a lot of tests

Stupid idea?

Tldr Pages - <https://tldr.sh>

Simplified and community-driven man pages



## tldr-pages

COLLABORATIVE CHEATSHEETS FOR CONSOLE COMMANDS

## Not so stupid

- Give tests for hundred of commands
- Can be fully automated
- More complex than *foo --help*
- Can be used as base to manage hundred of tests: generated and manual



## useradd

Create a new user. See also: `users`, `userdel`, `usermod`. More information: <https://manned.org/useradd>.

- Create a new user:

```
sudo useradd username
```

- Create a new user with the specified user id:

```
sudo useradd --uid id username
```

- Create a new user with the specified shell:

```
sudo useradd --shell path/to/shell username
```

- Create a new user belonging to additional groups (mind the lack of whitespace):

```
sudo useradd --groups group1,group2,... username
```

- Create a new user with the default home directory:

```
sudo useradd --create-home username
```

- Create a new user with the home directory filled by template directory files:

```
sudo useradd --skel path/to/template_directory --create-home username
```

- Create a new system user without the home directory:

```
sudo useradd --system username
```


## More stupid than you think

- What are?

*username*

*path/to/other/root*

- Interactive program?
- Not enough for complex GUI such as Gnome and KDE
- Better on a VM



The screenshot shows the help text for the `userdel` command in a Linux terminal. The text is as follows:

```
Linux
userdel

Remove a user account or remove a user from a group. See also: users , useradd , usermod . More
information: https://manned.org/userdel.

• Remove a user:

sudo userdel username

• Remove a user in other root directory:

sudo userdel --root path/to/other/root username

• Remove a user along with the home directory and mail spool:

sudo userdel --remove username
```

The last line of code, `sudo userdel --remove username`, is highlighted with a black box.

## Apparmor profile test suite

- Use TLDR to bootstrap scenarios
- Work in Progress
  - Over 150 profiles tested
  - Over 350 tests

## Results

- Early profiles tested raised a few apparmor logs
- Kind of logs raised
  - Useless*    Missing consoles access
  - Useful*    Missing execution & transition

```
- name: acpi
  profiled: true
  root: false
  require: []
  arguments: {}
  tests:
    - dsc: Show battery information
      cmd: acpi
      stdin: []
    - dsc: Show thermal information
      cmd: acpi -t
      stdin: []
    - dsc: Show cooling device information
      cmd: acpi -c
      stdin: []
    - dsc: Show thermal information in Fahrenheit
      cmd: acpi -tf
      stdin: []
    - dsc: Show all information
      cmd: acpi -V
      stdin: []
    - dsc: Extract information from `/proc` instead of `/sys`
      cmd: acpi -p
      stdin: []
```



1. Upstream integration
2. Rewrite Dbus rules
3. Full system policy
4. Tests, Tests, Tests

Help is welcome

Code [github.com/roddhjav/apparmor.d](https://github.com/roddhjav/apparmor.d)

Docs [apparmor.pujol.io](https://apparmor.pujol.io)

Questions?

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